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Abstract
This paper develops a role-based framework of intermediaries in regulatory programs. In examining the types of roles that
organizations adopt in regulation and governance, we argue that roles have important implications for understanding organi-
zational and program level dynamism and outcomes. We use the Regulator–Intermediary–rule-Taker framework to describe
how organizational roles can be adopted through assignment, appropriation, or promotion. We then go deeper into how inter-
mediaries adopt a variety of different roles in key regulatory programs. We examine generic intermediary roles across pro-
grams that involve four main groups of activities: creating and/or organizing, coordinating between programs, supporting
implementation, and voicing an opinion. All in all, our role-based framework allows for a novel relational way to understand
interorganizational and institutional dynamism in complex, interactive, and ever-changing regulatory regimes.
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1. Introduction
The landscape of both transnational and national governance has changed significantly in the past decades. We
have seen the rapid growth of transnational multistakeholder initiatives alongside governmental and intergovern-
mental regulation (Levi-Faur 2005; Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson 2006; Bartley 2007; Waddock 2008; Abbott & Sni-
dal 2009; Ména & Palazzo 2012; Brès et al. 2018). At the same time, companies are rapidly adopting voluntary
self-regulatory measures, often titled corporate social responsibility, to address pressing social and environmental
concerns (Aguinis & Glavas 2012; Pisani et al. 2017). Both old and new actors are adopting novel roles in the
middle ground between hierarchical rulemaking and market-based mechanisms (Powell 1990; Peterman et al.
2014). In this study, we explore a range of regulatory programs and highlight the intermediary roles in these
programs.
Recent studies have explored intermediary roles in regulation that provide assistance to regulators and/or
rule-takers (Abbott et al. 2017a,b; Brès et al. 2018). However, we still have a rather limited understanding of the
types of organizations that become regulatory intermediaries, the activities that they perform, their dynamic
interaction with other organizations, and what makes them successful. This special issue provides particularly
important insights into the functioning of these actors (Brès et al. 2018). While studies of individual
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intermediaries are emerging (Auld & Renckens 2017; De Silva 2017; Lytton 2017; see also the contributions to
this special issue), their motives, resources, relationships, and activities, in and across governance programs, have
received less attention (Abbott et al. 2017a,b). Thus far, the focus of recent, especially empirical, research has been
on specific actors, instead of an evaluation of how different elements need to be aligned to successfully enact a
regulatory intermediary role and how dynamic interaction takes place in and across regulatory programs.
Our emphasis is on transnational regulatory programs, which we define as any type of governance initiatives
targeting business conduct involving multiple organizations and occurring in more than one country. We are in
line with Brès et al. in seeing these programs as the product of the “social construction of rules for global business
conduct” (2018, forthcoming). Examples include government-led regulation (e.g. European Union Corporate Law
Directives), civil society programs (e.g. the Fair Trade Label and the Forest Stewardship Council), and business-
organized initiatives (e.g. Business Social Compliance Initiative).
This paper poses the following research question: What kind of intermediary roles do organizations adopt in
regulatory programs? Our objective is to provide a classification of governance programs regulating business con-
duct and a framework of related intermediary roles and role processes. The first parts of the paper review and
expand the Regulator–Intermediary–rule-Taker (RIT) framework posited by Abbott et al. (2017b) and examine
the emerging notion of an organizational role. We then present a classification of governance programs, clarifying
the drivers and implementation barriers of each program, and explore the possible intermediary roles in these
programs. Next, we discuss the key insights of our role-based theorizing for regulation and governance, and par-
ticularly the area of regulatory intermediaries. Finally, we conclude by summarizing our key contributions and
suggesting topics for further inquiry. All things considered, we argue that roles are a useful framework for provid-
ing an inclusive relational account of organizational behavior and interorganizational dynamism in regulatory
programs and that they have important implications for both organizational and program level outcomes.
2. Regulators, intermediaries, and rule-takers
Recent research has recognized the significance of intermediary actors in the implementation of regulatory pro-
grams on the intended rule-takers. The RIT model has been utilized to express the (mainly) top down assignment
of a specific role or set of roles for intermediaries (Abbott et al. 2017b). While the “T” in the framework has been
referred to both as Targets and rule-Takers, we use the latter to emphasize the agency of these actors (Abbott
et al. 2017a,b; Brès et al. 2018). The RIT framework has also highlighted the organizational variation of interme-
diaries in terms of, for example, their legitimacy, impact, and efficiency (Abbott et al. 2017b). Other studies have
emphasized the challenges of such arrangements as a regulator–intermediary principal–agency reliability problem
(Kruck 2017), a networked actors’ coordination issue (Jordana 2017), or a challenge of regulatory capture
(Maggetti et al. 2017). Further studies have found variation in context ranging from the type of regulatory setting
– private, public, or hybrid (Abbott et al. 2017a). Thus, it is clear that regulatory intermediaries offer an exciting
area of research as a result of their complexity, dynamism, and the related challenges and opportunities (Brès
et al. 2018).
In today’s transnational regulatory context involving multiple actors, it can be observed that in practice, inter-
mediaries are not always assigned specific or discrete roles and this assignment is not done by regulators alone
(see Lytton 2017; Abbott et al. 2017a,b). As Abbott et al. note, “regulators and targets can expand their capacities
by selecting, engaging and even creating intermediaries” (2017b, p. 16). Intermediaries’ interaction with, and
influence by, the takers of regulation certainly contribute to the practice of implementation of regulatory pro-
grams (Abbott et al. 2017a). Furthermore, the resources and capabilities of the intermediaries not only affect the
performance of the assigned mediation itself, but also allow for the expansion of intermediaries’ roles (van der
Heijden, 2017), and even introduce actors with independent agency to the RIT framework.
Thus, we utilize the RIT framework of Abbott et al. (2017a,b) to show the complexity of intermediary role
adoption. As Figure 1 indicates, intermediary roles can be adopted though processes of: (i) role assignment in
which the regulator formally defines the intermediary role; (ii) role appropriation in which the intermediary takes
the lead on defining its role in the relationship between regulator and rule-taker; or (iii) role promotion in which
rule-takers support and propel the intermediary into its role (see also Brès et al. 2018). Instead of emphasizing
the regulator’s role assignment and a unidirectional flow of intention and action, we aim to discuss the role
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adoption processes of regulatory intermediaries. By “role adoption” we simply mean an actor taking on or devel-
oping a role, whether assigned by another actor or by the actor itself (i.e. role assignment, appropriation, or pro-
motion). Thus, the activities related to role adoption may be officially defined, such as by the regulator, or may
be the result of role innovation or another informal or emergent dynamic within and/or across actors, as dis-
cussed by Brès et al. (2018).
The RIT framework (Figure 1) allows us to explore the dynamics between, and the agency of, all key actors
(regulators, intermediaries, and rule-takers or targets), as well as move away from unidirectional top-down or
bottom-up type thinking to an understanding of the regulation of business conduct as an emergent process (see
Abbott et al. 2017a; Lytton 2017). In principle, any type of actor can become a regulatory intermediary and this
process can be more or less formal depending on the type of role adoption. Indeed, the process by which the roles
themselves are defined and imagined necessitates an emergent process of both formal and informal social con-
structions of meaning (Brès et al. 2018).
Generally speaking, role assignment by regulators is likely to be more formal in nature, followed by rule-
taker-driven role promotion, and, ultimately, role appropriation by intermediaries themselves typically being
more informal in nature. Abbott et al. (2017a) discuss the variation by which intermediaries may enter a regula-
tory setting via contract, delegated authority, other formal engagements, orchestration, or tacit emergence. It is
also common for multiple organizations to aim to adopt a similar intermediary role in situations of competing
standards and certifications, or for organizations to compete to become the relevant intermediaries of particular
regulatory programs. In this emergent process, regulators, intermediaries, and rule-takers adopt a variety of orga-
nizational roles. The processes of role assignment and promotion can be seen as similar in the sense that there is
one actor who assigns another actor to a role (see Havinga & Verbruggen 2017; Lytton 2017). Nonetheless, it
matters whether the actor assigning the role is a regulator or a rule-taker. A regulator is usually motivated to
implement a common minimum standard (compared to a taker’s possible aim to resist regulation or to use it as
a competitive tool), and is more resource-rich and connected in terms of relationships (typically coming from a
more legitimate and powerful position) than the rule-taker. Role adoption can be seen to involve organizational
motives, resources, relationships, and activities, which we explore next.
3. Organizational roles
The notion of an organization adopting a role is not novel in regulation and governance, but the term has typi-
cally been used either implicitly or in a loosely defined way. Traditionally, scholars have assigned the societal sec-
tors of government, business, and civil society specific and fairly static roles. As regulators, governments have
mandated, facilitated, partnered, or endorsed (Fox et al. 2002), using informational, economic, legal, and/or part-
nering instruments (Steurer 2010; see also Gulbrandsen 2014). For instance, a government could mandate compa-
nies to produce environmental and social reports, or it could support an intermediary initiative, such as the
Global Reporting Initiative’s guidelines for sustainability reporting. Corporations, as takers of regulation, have
been seen as leaders and laggards, or dirty and clean (e.g. Bansal & Roth 2000; Prakash & Kollman 2004), while
social or sustainable entrepreneurs are often perceived as innovators (Cohen & Winn 2007; Dacin et al. 2010).
For example, perceived corporate sustainability leaders, such as Unilever and Patagonia, tend to be active in a
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Figure 1 Role adoption processes within Regulator–Intermediary–rule-Taker (RIT) framework (adapted from Abbott et al.
2017b).
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range of regulatory programs, while laggards tend to be more passive or can adopt strategies to influence legisla-
tion through, for instance, lobbying (Ruggie 2017). Civil society, on the other hand, has played many roles toward
business and regulation, such as so-called sharks, orcas, sea lions, and dolphins (Elkington & Fennell 1998; van
Tulder & van der Zwart, 2006), or preservers, protesters, modifiers, and scrutinizers (Ahlström & Sjöström 2005).
For instance, Hoffman (2009) conducted network analyses to identify distinct roles that environmental nongo-
vernmental organizations (NGO) enacted toward industry. In this study, World Wildlife Fund was labeled as a
mediator at the core of corporate networks, Rainforest Alliance was seen as a bridge across industries, and
Friends of the Earth was called an isolate because of its adversarial relation to corporations.
While these mostly descriptive studies have often defined roles in a conceptually loose way, more recent work
has attempted to develop a more systematic role-based framework for analyzing organizational activities across
sectors. For example, recent studies have examined the roles that environmental NGOs adopt in relation to
industry in the United States (US) – Bertels et al. (2014) identify portals, coordinators, members, fringe players,
and purists – and the roles of different organizations in industrial symbiosis networks in the United Kingdom
(UK) – Paquin and Howard-Grenville (2013) emphasize the central role of network orchestrators. Similarly,
Peterman et al. (2014) explore the roles that US government agencies adopt in an energy efficiency network with
public, corporate, and civil society members. The authors lab government agencies as commissioners, inter-
preters, marketers, or users. In a follow-up study, they find that role adoption – in this case whether you take
central versus more passive roles in the network – has important consequences on the types of knowledge that
participants gain from the program (Peterman et al. 2015). Finally, using survey data, Nasiritousi et al. (2016)
distinguish between a range of activities or roles that non-state actors enact when taking part in climate change
conferences.
In this paper, we develop a framework of intermediary roles. In this context, we define an organizational role
as a purposive, resource-based, and relational function exhibited through a specific activity or a set of activities in
a regulatory program. Building on the work of Peterman et al. (2014, 2015), Nasiritousi et al. (2016), and Abbott
et al. (2017b), we perceive an organizational role to involve four key interrelated elements: the activities that the
organization exhibits in this program; the motives that an organization has to participate in a particular program;
the relevant resources available to the organization; and the relationships to other actors in this program. These
four elements are depicted in Figure 2. We see motives and resources as organizational attributes, while relation-
ships and activities take place within the program.
In defining the notion of an organizational role, we explain that it is “exhibited through a specific activity or a
set of activities” to indicate that the most visible aspect of organizational roles are the activities that they involve.
Nonetheless, to be able to perform a role successfully, these activities need to be aligned with motives, resources,
and relationships. For instance, if a civil society organization is highly motivated to appropriate an orchestrating
role in a private regulatory scheme, it will need an extensive resource base and strong ties across all types of
Interorganizational
activities
Within regulatory program Within organization
Interorganizational
relationships
Organizational 
motives
Organizational 
resources
ORGANIZATIONAL ROLE
Figure 2 Elements of an organizational role.
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relevant organizations. In this paper, we explore different types of intermediary roles by examining how specific
exhibited activities need to be aligned with specific motives, resources, and relationships.
Previous research on regulatory intermediaries has also explored elements such as motives, resources, and
relationships. Abbott et al. (2017b) indicate that the motives of regulatory intermediaries may vary widely, includ-
ing receiving payment, achieving competitive benefit, creating social value, and/or shaping regulation. Abbott and
Snidal (2009) and Abbott et al. (2017b) also present essential competencies or capacities that regulatory interme-
diaries need. We view two of their essential capacities as corresponding to resource-related elements – expertise
and operational capacity – and two of their capacities as relevant to the types of relationships regulatory interme-
diaries have – independence from regulators and rule-takers and representativeness/legitimacy.
While Peterman et al. (2014, 2015) describe how an organizational role involves motives, resources, and rela-
tionships, each of these elements is also present in recent theorizing on regulators, intermediaries, and rule-takers.
For instance, Abbott et al. describe how “the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) enlists independent bod-
ies to accredit private auditors to monitor food imports, supplementing the limited number of agency inspectors”
(2017a, p. 15). The motives of the FDA are communicated to private auditors through contracts, standards, and
inspection guidelines set by the regulator. The activity of the intermediaries in this context necessitates an under-
standing of the complementary and available resources of not only the private auditors, but also the regulator
and its limited number of inspectors. The FDA is vastly outnumbered by the number of rule-takers to which its
regulation is applied, yet its mandate requires a wide inspection. Thus, the need to acquire resources introduces a
relationship with intermediaries enacting a role in line with the regulator’s, the FDA’s, motives. The relationship
between the regulator and intermediaries can become more or less formal depending on the provision of the
mandate, contracts, and the exchange of resources. In terms of relationships, the FDA is clearly in a central gov-
ernance position with a formally mandated relationship to the vast number of rule-takers. Thus, examining the
activities and their underlying elements contributes to the RIT model and “helps us to better understand both
intragovernmental and extragovernmental relationships within regulatory regimes” (Abbott et al. 2017a, p. 18).
As such, the FDA’s role and its interconnectedness to other actors’ roles can be better understood by examining
interrelated motives, resources, relationships, and activities.
In studying regulatory intermediaries, we argue that it is useful not only to recognize the activities they per-
form, but also to understand the alignment of activities with elements that allow a role to be adopted success-
fully. We argue that organizational motives, resources, and relationships are an integral part in understanding
organizational activities in regulatory programs. While all of these elements can be conceptually measured
independent of each other, they are demonstrably interrelated not only for a particular actor, but also across
actors. Thus, roles should not be examined in isolation but inclusively and relative to each other. While it is
important to understand the activities conducted and roles adopted by regulatory intermediaries at the organi-
zational level, the development of roles also takes place through interaction at the program level and across
programs. In our study, we focus on how regulatory intermediaries adopt roles exhibited by a specific activity
or set of activities within regulatory programs, and also propose how organizational motives, resources, and
relationships need to be aligned to perform this activity. Furthermore, it should be noted that a single organiza-
tion can adopt several roles and multiple organizations can adopt the same role in an interorganizational
setting.
The inspiration for a more systematic examination of interorganizational roles comes partly from the sym-
bolic interactionist tradition of role theory (see Biddle & Thomas 1966; Biddle 1986; Jones & Volpe 2011), which
has a long history in sociology and social psychology. According to this theory, individuals’ social behavior is pre-
dictable based on socially defined roles. Actors may hold any number of social roles, such as mother, employee,
and citizen, each of which involves a set of expectations, duties, and behaviors that a person may or may not ful-
fill in relation to other persons. While research within role theory has predominantly focused on individual roles,
this paper reviews attempts to bring some elements of role theory to the organizational level. Thus, while we do
acknowledge that there are differences between interpersonal and interorganizational levels, we perceive that
organizations go beyond instrumental benefits in responding to relational expectations. Organizations are able to
enact multiple roles and these should be understood and explored as interrelated to other roles within the interor-
ganizational context. In line with Brès et al. (2018), this brings to the forefront the socially constructed nature of
regulatory programs.
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In this paper, we extend the emerging literature on organizational roles and offer a role-based classification to
examine different regulatory programs and the work of regulatory intermediaries.
4. Classification of regulatory programs
Transnational governance of business conduct takes place through a variety of programs ranging from mandatory
legislation to more voluntary approaches. In this section, we categorize and briefly review existing generic regula-
tory programs and their interaction in transnational governance. Figure 3, when examined column-by-column,
presents the drivers that have led to the emergence of particular governance programs, and names these generic
programs and the remaining barriers to the implementation of each type.
The classification provides a sense of this complexity and breath of transnational governance of business con-
duct by depicting the drivers, forms, and barriers of key generic programs ranging from mandatory international
intergovernmental legislation to alliances. The figure does not provide a very detailed account of all programs
(e.g. separating between a variety of different guidelines, codes, standards, and labels), but arguably bundles and
covers the most important types. It also takes into consideration interaction between different programs over
time, the development of hybrid programs, and the emergence of new programs. In terms of the RIT framework,
the regulator itself has a formal role in mandatory governmental or international legislation, and typically in the
related incentives as well. Incentives can also be developed and implemented by regulatory intermediaries and/or
in collaboration with rule-takers. Certifications and alliance programs are forms of regulatory intermediaries
themselves in which rule-takers can also participate.
Figure 3 distinguishes between four regulatory programs. First, governmental and intergovernmental legisla-
tion aims to create minimum standards, but faces many challenges, including market imperfections and enforce-
ment (Short & Toffel 2010; Wright et al. 2012; Bartley 2014). Examples of transnational legislation are European
Union Corporate Law Directives or international labor rights agreements. Second, incentives are not a rule-
setting program per se, but have been created to facilitate the implementation of technologies and new collabora-
tions (Mitev & Venters 2009). An example is a regional incentive program to support renewable energy, such as
a European Union program implemented by national governments. Third, hundreds of certification schemes
ranging from forest certification to working conditions in the apparel industry also exist (see Bartley 2007;
Drivers
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Reducing 
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Externalities, 
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participation 
New program evolution and hybridization
Figure 3 Classification of regulatory governance programs and their drivers and barriers (adapted from Peterman
et al. 2012).
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Abbott & Snidal 2009). Prominent examples of this form of private regulation include the Fair Trade label, Forest
Stewardship Council, and Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED). Within the category of certi-
fication, we include a range of standardization schemes, guidelines, and principle statements aiming to function
as voluntary rule setting. Fourth, we also see a blooming of regional and national alliance programs around issues
such as energy, water, waste, and infrastructure. Examples include alliances related to energy conservation of
buildings (Peterman et al. 2014), industrial symbiosis (Paquin & Howard-Grenville 2013), and zero-carbon built
environments (Rydin 2013). These types of initiatives differ from certification schemes as they focus on knowl-
edge sharing and innovation without a rule-setting agenda. Alliances thus support implementation by organizing
typically smaller scale interorganizational networks.
All of these different programs have emerged in specific temporal, geographical, societal, and political con-
texts to deal with existing challenges. The field of governance programs is thus clearly dynamic and intertwined
(Abbott & Snidal 2013; Grabosky 2013; Auld 2014; Eberlein et al. 2014). As an example of the interconnectedness
of programs, incentives are closely linked to legislation. Often certification programs become legislation, as is the
case with Global Reporting Initiative sustainability reporting guidelines converting into law in some Nordic coun-
tries (Glasbergen 2011) and the LEED building certificate becoming the building code in the city of San Francisco
(Peterman et al. 2012). Alliances support the implementation and development of other regulatory programs. In
Figure 3, regulatory dynamism is indicated by the bottom box of new and hybrid program evolution. Our frame-
work thus allows for the evolution of programs over time to address new barriers.
Our classification of regulatory programs differs from prior categorizations, such as Abbott and Snidal’s
(2009) actor-centric and Palazzo and Scherer’s (2010) form-centric ones. Our categorization tends to be more
inclusive, as strictly speaking, it contains not only regulatory programs but also programs related to their imple-
mentation – incentives and alliances, neither of which are aimed directly at developing rules to govern business
conduct. The reason for taking a more inclusive approach is to be able to explore a wider range of regulatory
intermediaries. Nonetheless, it should be noted that in contrast to Abbott and Snidal (2009), we do not include
single-actor initiatives. At the same time, our classification is not as fine-grained as Abbott and Snidal’s (2009) or
Palazzo and Scherer’s (2010). For instance, we group Palazzo and Scherer’s (2010) standards and procedures of
auditing and compliance enforcement together with the marketing of labels and certifications into one category.
We argue that our classification of regulatory programs and subsequent theorizing of organizational roles is
applicable to transnational as well as national and local levels. However, it is important to take into consideration
several differences at these levels, such as the added complexity of overlapping layers of governance and the
sometimes contradictory elements of regulatory prescriptions. Local and national forms of political and social
organizing typically have a longer history and thus legacy compared to transnational governance forms that often
tackle global problems that have only been recognized in the last few decades. Furthermore, there are multiple
regulatory gaps at the transnational level, potentially leading firms to move their operations to pollution havens
or to enter a so-called race to the bottom to reach the lowest labor costs. Transnational regulatory programs also
face coordination difficulties because of the larger number of actors. On the one hand, there are situations of
asymmetric information between different organizations, as well as the potential for added confusion at the orga-
nizational level. On the other hand, there are further opportunities for innovation related to translational and
coordinative roles. Additionally, the voices of marginalized actors, especially at the local level, may not be heard.
These programs bring forth further power elements as the resources and influence of established transnational
actors enable them to occupy central positions. All things considered, we argue that our theorizing about roles is
applicable to all levels of analysis from the very local to the global, but the inherent differences in these forms of
organizing need to be taken into consideration. We turn next to the variety of intermediary roles and related
activities that exist in the identified regulatory programs.
5. Intermediary roles in regulatory programs
Recent work has aimed to provide broad overviews of activities related to regulatory programs. While not specifi-
cally listing organizational roles, Abbott et al. (2017a,b) describe several activities of regulatory intermediaries.
Intermediaries’ work is varied as they interpret and elaborate, translate into practice, provide assistance, evaluate
alternatives, monitor compliance, enforce rules, create dialogue and trust, or combine some of these activities.
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“Meta-intermediaries” accredit and supervise monitors themselves to ensure their trustworthiness. Furthermore,
grounded in an empirical analysis of actors taking part in climate change conferences, Nasiritousi et al. (2016)
offer a categorization of non-state actor governance activities, which includes influencing the agenda, influencing
policymakers, taking mitigating action, taking adaptive action, proposing solutions, providing expertise, evaluat-
ing consequences, raising awareness, representing public opinion, and representing marginalized voices. We use
these prior activity categorizations, as well as systematic role analyses (Bertels et al. 2014; Peterman et al. 2014),
as a foundation for our theorizing and examine roles in the context of regulatory programs. We propose a
broader view and a less fine-grained categorization by combining many of these activities into roles related to
supporting the implementation of a program and voicing an opinion on such a program. In addition to these
forms of intermediary activity, we are also interested in the creation of different regulatory programs and, an
often-overlooked aspect, the coordination roles between multiple programs.
While recent research has started to examine the diversity of regulatory intermediaries and activities (Abbott
et al. 2017a,b), little is known about the roles they are adopting, either formal or informal. Table 1 summarizes
the intermediary roles that are available to a variety of organizations in each previously discussed regulatory pro-
gram. Any individual organization can potentially adopt multiple roles and a single role can be adopted by multi-
ple organizations. These roles may of course be shed by the actors that adopt them or, in the case of a mandate,
revoked. The roles may also evolve over time in line with, or independent of, the actors, which themselves are
not static. Thus, the resulting governance structure emerges from a “trickle-up and trickle-down” process across
the fluid regulatory field (Bothello & Mehrpouya 2018) in which both actors and their roles may change and
interact. Intermediaries take on different roles to compete and position themselves within the regulatory field
(Bothello & Mehrpouya 2018).
We can cluster generic roles emerging from our analysis in Table 1. These roles involve the following four
main activities: creating and/or organizing a program, coordinating between programs, supporting the implemen-
tation of a program, and voicing an opinion about a program. Each of these activities can be formal or informal
depending on the level of development of the program and the dynamics of actors involved. The formality is
reflected in the reading, intermediation, and interpretation of laws and social construction of the resulting rules
of conduct (Brès et al. 2018). Informality can also occur by design, as formal roles tend to be more legitimate, but
informal roles can be more flexible. The rigidity of the order can vary across levels, such as local or international
organizations, as well as over time, as soft laws can become hard once endorsed by governments (Brès et al. 2018.
p. 4). The effectiveness of these roles is dependent on a constellation of rule-intermediaries (Bothello & Mehr-
pouya 2018) and their dynamics.
Creating and/or organizing a program involves the roles of Creator, Commissioner, Convenor, and Disruptor
(see e.g. Jiang & Bansal 2003; Peterman et al. 2014). These roles tend to be more formal, involving strong motives
to affect regulation and develop new (proto)institutional structures aimed at standardization. They tend to
involve significant resources and relationships, especially in programs that have been able to gain legitimacy and
scale. The exception would be an actor trying to disrupt existing regulatory regimes by creating a new competing
program. In this case, the motives for change are likely to be high, but the resource-base and extent of interorga-
nizational relationships will be central to achieving success and legitimacy.
An example of a Creator organization is the Council on Economic Priorities, which established Social
Accountability International (Bothello & Mehrpouya 2018). However, as the rule-takers’ areas of business con-
duct become seen as legitimately subject to regulation, they may experience multiple incompletely overlapping
programs that vary from the harder local and national to softer transnational level programs (Abbott et al.
2017a). These programs themselves – each with their respective regulators, intermediaries, and rule-takers –
compete, operate in parallel, and collaborate. Targeted actors have also developed separate programs and have
taken on the role of Creator of programs preferring industry self-regulation. The forestry sector, for example, is
an early instance of a targeted industry creating a private self-regulation program for its industry (Bartley 2007).
The timing of the creation or organization of programs varies across cases ranging from rule-taker developed pre-
emptive programs, as per the sweatshop and sustainable forestry examples, to the usurping of regulator required
disclosure programs, such as in the case of fracking industry intermediaries (Avidan et al. 2018, p. 4). In terms of
other roles, within the Better Buildings Alliance, a cross-sector alliance aiming to improve the energy efficiency of
buildings, the US Department of Energy took on the role of Commissioner (Peterman et al. 2014), while The
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Table 1 Intermediary organizational roles in regulatory programs
Governance
program
Intermediary role and activity Alignment with motives,
resources, and relationships
Example
1. Legislation Harmonizer: supports
consistency of program across
regimes
Moderate motives to affect
regulation and create social
change, relevant resources and
expertise, and strong relational
network
European Union aiming to
harmonize national and
international regulation
Facilitator: provides means for
program to take place
High motives to affect change,
considerable resources and
relationships
United Nations agency
providing platform for national
regulators to meet
Bridge: creates connections
across programs
Moderate motives to affect
regulation and create social change,
relevant resources and expertise,
and strong relational network
A consultancy advising on
effective dialogue structures for
multiple programs
Translator: explains the gap
between legal and practical
Moderate motives to create
change and/or receive payment,
task-specific resources and
strong local or user relationships
A labor union explaining global
regulation to national
organizations
Marketer: promotes program Moderate motives to create
change and/or receive payment,
communications related
resources and broad visibility in
terms of relationships
NGO supporting particular
legislation
Counselor: participates in
creation of program
High participation motives,
specific expertise and strong ties
to program creator
A stakeholder being consulted in
the drafting of legislation
Expert: provides knowledge High participation motives,
specific expertise and typically
independence from program
creator
University conducting research
on effects of particular
regulation
Critic: criticizes process or
outcome of program
High participation motives,
specific expertise and typically
independence from program
creator
A watchdog organization
criticizing regulatory process
2. Incentives Creator: builds the program. Strong motives to affect
regulation and standardizing,
and significant resources and
relationships
Government providing incentive
for company to implement
international program
Translator: explains the gap
between legal and practical
Moderate motives to create
change and/or receive payment,
task-specific resources and
strong local or user
relationships.
Consultancy helping
organization make use of
incentive opportunity
Marketer: promotes program Moderate motives to create
change and/or receive payment,
communications related
resources and broad visibility in
terms of relationships
Political party supporting
program
Expert: provides knowledge. High participation motives,
specific expertise and typically
independence from program
creator
Research institute studying
impact of incentives
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Forests Dialogue (TFD) is an example of a Convenor bringing together a range of stakeholders to explore sustain-
able forest management and conservation globally. Often the development of new forms of programs has
involved a certain level of interruption, as Disruptors aim to bring new competing programs to an existing system
of governance programs.
Coordinating between programs is a job for Bridges, Harmonizers, and Consolidators. These roles typically
involve moderate motives to affect regulation and create social change, relevant resources and expertise, and a
strong relational network. The key success factor of enacting these roles is the embeddedness into multiple net-
works and the perceived legitimacy as an actor coordinating between multiple programs. These coordinating roles
allow for some flexibility across different levels, such as local level adaptation to national or global programs. An
example of a regulatory coordinator is the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives/Local Gov-
ernments for Sustainability, a regulatory intermediary serving as a Bridge for urban sustainable development poli-
cies between the United Nations and local authorities (Bothello & Mehrpouya 2018). Similarly, the European
Table 1 Continued
Governance
program
Intermediary role and activity Alignment with motives,
resources, and relationships
Example
3. Certification Convenor: provides platform for
program development
Strong motives to affect
regulation and standardizing,
and significant resources and
relationships
NGO providing platform for
new multistakeholder initiative
Enforcer: verifies standard
implementation
High motives to create change
and/or receive payment,
task-specific resources and
strong ties to program
creator
Consultancy enforcing a
certification scheme.
Expert: provides knowledge. High participation motives,
specific expertise and typically
independence from program
creator
University conducting research
on the development of
certification
4. Alliances Commissioner: initiates platform
for multistakeholder interaction
Strong motives to affect
regulation and standardizing,
and significant resources and
relationships
Ministry initiating and
organizing a multistakeholder
initiative
Marketer: promotes alliance. Moderate motives to create
change and/or receive payment,
communications related
resources and broad visibility in
terms of relationships
Member organization promoting
alliance to non-members
Expert: provides knowledge High participation motives,
specific expertise and typically
independence from program
creator
NGO supporting alliance by
sharing its expertise
New programs
and
hybridization
Disruptor: addresses existing
barriers by creating new
competing programs or hybrids
Strong motives to affect
regulation and standardizing,
and significant resources and
relationships
NGO launches new type of
program to compete with an
existing one.
Consolidator: merges existing
programs
Moderate motives to affect
regulation and create social
change, relevant resources and
expertise, and strong relational
network
Two separate programs decide
to merge into one
NGO, non-governmental organization.
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Union plays a Harmonizer role in coordinating across European national food agencies (Brès et al. 2018). Coor-
dination across regulatory programs may be an activity that is divided across a constellation of actors and institu-
tions, as in the case of NGOs, investors, and unions (Monciardini & Conaldi 2018).
In instances of nascent regulatory fields where the structures are yet to be defined, intermediaries in emerging
programs may be supported by sponsors from adjacent or proximate fields (Bothello & Mehrpouya 2018). Power-
ful actors, such as the so-called Big Four audit companies, may also influence the development of corporate social
responsibility policies that impact entire supply chains (Fransen & LeBaron 2018). As these intermediary actors
diffuse programs across sectors beyond their initial design, they enact a coordinating role. A Consolidator of pro-
grams can also emerge in nascent regulatory fields as programs, for instance, competing ecolabel schemes can
merge to achieve greater impact.
The broad category of supporting the implementation of a program is perhaps the area where research is most
needed (and arguably conducted) because of the variety of activities of organizations. These activities are com-
pleted by roles of Translator, Marketer, Facilitator, and Enforcer. Similarly, the types of organizations conducting
these activities are varied, ranging from consultants to government agencies and NGOs to think tanks (King &
Lenox 2000; Palazzo & Scherer 2010; Pierce & Toffel 2013; Brès & Gond 2014; Peterman et al. 2014, 2015). The
motives are equally varied and can, for instance, involve affecting regulation, achieving social change, and/or
receiving payment. The intermediary’s activities may also change through the process of program implementa-
tion. Expert intermediaries may evolve from apolitical technocrats to consultants (Bothello & Mehrpouya 2018).
While motives to participate are typically fairly high, resources and relationships can vary depending on the more
specific role. The specific resources and expertise that organizations can offer to support the implementation of
programs are going to become very important to successfully enact these roles.
Supporting the implementation of a program includes the types of activities mentioned by Abbott et al. (2017b),
including interpreting, elaborating, translating, providing assistance, evaluating alternatives, monitoring compliance,
and creating dialogue and trust. To implement regulatory programs, intermediaries both read and interpret the law
(Brès et al. 2018). Through their interpretation of rules, intermediaries can take on a jurisgenerative role, resulting
not in dialogue about regulation but the development of legal regimes, as in the case of the Fair Labor Association
(Brès et al. 2018; Paiement 2018). The intermediaries also specify their own role in the implementation process. For
example, a “technocratic” intermediary aims to make issues non-controversial and apolitical (Bothello & Mehrpouya
2018, p. 13). By providing a version of the implementation of the program, intermediaries may also become the tar-
gets of capture (Abbott et al. 2017a). Alternatively, rule-takers may promote intermediaries to fulfill such a captured
role. For example, Avidan et al. (2018, p. 1) discuss how FracFocus implements a required disclosure program in
the fracking industry and makes important data available but does so in a manner that limits accessibility and
reduces the comprehensibility of environmental and public health risks.
Intermediaries themselves may expand their role by appropriation and advancement of their own agenda. For
example, the Big Four audit firms arrive at their own interpretation of social and financial outcomes and, in
doing so wield influence over public and private regulators and other stakeholder groups (Fransen & LeBaron
2018, p. 4). In cases of wide but inconsistent regulatory adoption, the targeted actors may even become fatigued
by the implementation of different audits and standards (Locke 2013).
Finally, voicing an opinion, can take the form of becoming a formal Expert or Counselor or a (usually) less
formalized Critic role. These roles typically involve high motives to participate (e.g. ranging from shaping regula-
tion to achieving social change and from receiving payment to exhibiting organizational identity), relevant
resources, and a varying degree of relational embeddedness. Different actors can take on the various roles avail-
able to intermediaries through which they can voice their influence over the regulatory process. In an aforemen-
tioned example, the independence and legitimacy of expert intermediaries is highlighted in cases such as the US
fracking industry where FracFocus speaks as an intermediary while essentially operating as an industry-driven
initiative disguised as a regulator (Avidan et al. 2018, p. 1). To complicate the distinctions between regulators and
rule-takers, the Expert roles taken on by intermediary actors may well oscillate in terms of their independence
and subjective legitimacy. For example, analysts in pharmaceutical companies have been described as knowledge
intermediaries that at times serve differing interests (Mehrpouya & Samiolo 2018). Finally, increasing attention
has recently been paid to activist participation in regulatory processes, often as Critics (Dubuisson-Quellier 2013;
Ména & Waeger 2014; Nasiritousi et al. 2016).
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All things considered, we see patterns emerging from our role analysis. To understand intermediary roles in
regulation, we argue that it is necessary to examine who participates, why they do so, what they bring to the table,
who they know and interact with, and what they do. Each factor needs to be aligned to successfully enact a role.
We agree that it is necessary not only to analyze particular programs or initiatives but also to assess larger struc-
tures including, but not limited to, for example, supply chains and their underlying dynamics (Bothello & Mehr-
pouya 2018).
6. Role insights for research on regulatory intermediaries
Based on this overview of the range of roles in regulatory programs, we can emphasize the benefits of a role-
based framework. It can provide several insights into understanding complex regulatory environments. First, it
necessitates a broad analysis of involved organizations, their motives, resources, interconnectedness with other
relevant actors in and across regulatory programs, and their activities. It also allows us to explore cooperation
and conflict as often several organizations, each supported by their respective configurations of elements, aim for
the same or a similar role. Through an analysis of the underlying elements underpinning regulatory roles, indi-
vidual organizations can better understand the opportunities they have for role adoption and the constraints they
may face if changing their role or adopting a new one. They can also better identify the levers of change, and dis-
tinguish between more central and peripheral roles.
Second, the framework opens up the possibility to analyze roles that span across regulatory programs, empha-
sizing coordination and knowledge flows across programs. It is common for one organization to enact different
roles across multiple regulatory programs. In comparing role constellations across programs, we can also identify
roles that exist in one context and that are missing in another, with potential implications to the effectiveness
and impact of a program. Ultimately, when assessing national role configurations, we can estimate why some
countries are developing faster or implementing stricter policies than others, why some technologies are adopted
while others are not, and why some organizations’ voices are heard while others’ are not.
Third, role-based analysis of regulatory programs allows for the study not only of the identification of roles
and related success factors but also of dynamism and role processes, including both downstream (Abbott et al.
2017c) as well as upstream processes (Brès et al. 2018). Indeed, by focusing on roles and their elements rather
than only the actors, one can more inclusively assess the potential of regulators, intermediaries, or rule-takers to
enact that role. Recognizing a competitive framing within regulatory programs, an assessment of the motives,
resources, relationships, and activities of the actors is necessary to understand each actor’s potential for assigning,
appropriating, or promoting program roles. We argue that such a perspective is of use not only for an analysis of
regulatory or role capture, but also for the identification of instances of institutional entrepreneurship in the form
of governance innovations through the recombination of these relative elements. Thus, a clarification of roles
enhances our understanding of the interrelated activities within the RIT framework.
Fourth, examining roles can shed light on how barriers to implementing regulatory programs can be over-
come. The identification of the roles and the underlying elements can provide insight into the relative alignment,
or indeed, misalignment, among the actors within the regulatory program. Such a perspective can benefit an anal-
ysis of program incentives, their misalignment, and potential knowledge gaps from each actor’s perspective. Simi-
larly, ambiguous outcomes in certification and alliances can be addressed through a perspective that recognizes
the elements required to enact such a role within the program. Our framework can also contribute to comparabil-
ity of a specific program and across programs. Finally, such a perspective may well allow for comment on the
structuring of regulation itself through a better understanding of how particular roles can address externalities,
inefficiencies, pricing, enforcement, and information asymmetries.
7. Conclusion
This paper developed a framework of intermediary roles in regulatory programs focused on business conduct.
We explored organizational roles as being exhibited through activities and enacted successfully depending on
alignment with organizational motives, relevant resources, and relationships with other actors. We first used and
extended the RIT framework to describe three role adoption processes: a regulator-driven role assignment for
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intermediaries, an intermediary-led role appropriation process, and an intermediary role promotion approach
supported by rule-takers. This novel way of using the RIT framework grants agency to all of the actors involved
and allows for further complexity in assessing regulatory programs and the constellation of roles therein. Further-
more, we identified four key regulatory programs – legislation, incentives, certification, and alliances – and
described the drivers and barriers of each. Building on recent research (Bertels et al. 2014; Peterman et al. 2014;
Nasiritousi et al. 2016; Abbott et al. 2017a,b,c), we presented generic intermediary roles for each of these regula-
tory programs. Subsequently, we discussed how role-based thinking at the program level and across programs
could provide several insights to the field of regulation and governance.
Previous literature has tended to focus on specific programs, such as legislation or certification, without pay-
ing enough attention to the dynamic interaction between programs. Similarly, the empirical focus has often been
on a specific actor itself, or in some cases, typologies of activities (Nasiritousi et al. 2016; Abbott et al. 2017a,b).
We build on these works by providing a relational role-based framework to analyze the dynamic complexity of
regulatory programs. While the focus thus far has been either on “who is doing what” or “what is being done,”
we argue that further emphasis should also be placed on what interrelated organizational elements are needed to
successfully enact roles of regulatory intermediaries, as well as how dynamic interorganizational interaction takes
place and should be organized in and across regulatory programs. In a more dynamic governance environment,
new and old actors are adopting novel roles to regulate business conduct and mediate this regulatory process.
Our analysis of intermediary roles raises many unanswered questions and/or un(der)researched areas in
transnational as well as national governance. We suggest further studies of a descriptive, normative, and instru-
mental nature for different levels of analysis. We propose scholars in the field of regulation and governance
should aim to describe the types of roles that different actors, especially intermediaries, adopt in different regula-
tory programs and the related role processes. Additionally, scholars are well positioned to also evaluate what kind
of role(s) organizations should adopt and how we should design regulatory regimes as constellations of roles.
Finally, at the organizational and institutional level, we can also analyze what roles and role constellations lead to
the best outcomes.
At the individual level, organizations need to decide which member should participate in the coordination
and implementation of a particular role. Research into the individual level backgrounds of key intermediary per-
sonnel may also affect the reading and interpretation of regulation, such as Mehrpouya and Samiolo’s (2018)
identification of pharmaceutical analysts’ business or health policy backgrounds. Based on anecdotal evidence, we
can say that company representatives, such as corporate responsibility directors or managers, often experience
fatigue in running from one sustainability initiative meeting to another. Instead of only exploring interorganiza-
tional interaction, the interpersonal level of regulatory work is understudied and undertheorized.
At the organizational level, scholars can study the opportunities for role innovation – that is, changing their
role or adopting a new one – as well as the related limits in particular regulatory contexts. In principle, any actor
(public, corporate, or civil society) can adopt any role but obviously there are constraints, such as lack of motiva-
tion, inadequate resources, and/or limited relationships. The roles that organizations adopt and the activities
exhibited need to be aligned with motives, resources, and relationships. However, more empirical research is
required to contextualize these elements within specific regulatory programs. At this stage, we know fairly little
about the organizational level consequences of roles. Adopting a particular role can have important implications
for knowledge and value creation or achieving other organizational aims. Furthermore, different situations of fail-
ure of role adoption should be documented and analyzed. Organizations can obviously take part in multiple gov-
ernance programs and enact multiple roles at the same time, which poses new challenges of how to manage
multiple roles simultaneously. The challenge for regulatory intermediaries becomes how to find the complemen-
tarities of multiple roles.
At the interorganizational level, we theorized about role assignment, appropriation, and promotion, but sev-
eral other role phenomena also exist, such as role consensus, conflict, and ambiguity (Peterman et al. 2015).
Transnational regulation is obviously not immune to conflict – far from it. Instances of role conflict of actors
fighting for the same or similar roles are common, for example, when examining competing standards (often
between industry and NGO-led standards). Role dynamism, including the possible transition from informality to
formality, as well as the distinctions between intermediaries and rule-takers and regulators (Paiement 2018),
should be explored further. As regulation diffuses through programs and actors, further research should look not
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only at industries, sectors, or initiatives, but also at intra-organizational relations, networks, and structures
(Peterman et al. 2014).
At the program level, we have long aimed to understand whether and how it is possible to manage or orches-
trate networks (see Provan & Kenis 2008). As roles involve relational expectations, they cannot be understood in
isolation. The context of roles, that is, what role constellations exist in different forms of regulatory approaches
(e.g. hierarchical initiatives vs. looser networks), is an important avenue for future research. Similarly, we need to
further develop criteria for evaluating individual regulatory programs, especially portfolios of programs. When is
a regulatory regime (a combination of multiple interacting governance programs) efficient, effective, impactful,
and/or sustainable? Do the actors – regulators, rule-takers, and intermediaries – in regulatory programs learn
from other programs (Avidan et al. 2018)? In its description of interacting regulatory governance programs,
Figure 2 is a simplification of a complex regulatory environment spanning multiple regulatory regimes and levels.
While it is a useful overview for the purposes of understanding organizational roles, it is likely to need further
refinement.
Thus, in terms of directions for future research, we should expand our understanding of organizational roles.
The list of intermediary roles presented in this paper is not likely to be exhaustive, thus it is important to expand
it using empirical research. Future research should test whether the mentioned elements of roles are indeed the
most salient in determining the successful enactment of a role or whether others exist. Scholars should explore
what is the potential of any organization to adopt a completely novel role or whether there are path dependencies
through which powerful organizations adopt more and more central roles. Recognizing the agency not only of
regulators and rule-takers but also of intermediaries, and research into role innovation or entrepreneurship, may
also inform inquiry into the emergence of new roles and role adoption by new actors in and across programs.
Cross-thematic and cross-institutional studies would be very beneficial to understand the boundary conditions of
our analysis. All things considered, intermediary roles in transnational and national regulation offer many fruitful
avenues for scholarly and practical work.
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